Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in the US. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens, focusing on what is perhaps the most basic and fundamental model in this space: the celebrated Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow. Here there are two players, a sender and a receiver. The receiver must take one of a number of actions with a-priori unknown payoff, and the sender has access to additional information regarding the payoffs of the various actions for both players. The sender can commit to revealing a noisy signal regarding the realization of the payoffs of various actions, and would like to do so as to maximize her own payoff in expectation assuming that the receiver rationally acts to maximize his own payoff. When the payoffs of various actions follow a joint distribution (the common prior), the sender's problem is nontrivial, and its computational complexity depends on the representation of this prior.
INTRODUCTION
"One quarter of the GDP is persuasion." This is both the title, and the thesis, of a 1995 paper by McCloskey and Klamer [39] . Since then, persuasion as a share of economic activity appears to be growing -a more recent estimate places the figure at 30% [4] . As both papers make clear, persuasion is intrinsic in most human endeavors. When the tools of "persuasion" are tangible -say goods, services, or money -this is the domain of traditional mechanism design, which steers the actions of one or many selfinterested agents towards a designer's objective. What [39, 4] and much of the relevant literature refer to as persuasion, however, are scenarios in which the power to persuade derives from an informational advantage of some party over others. This is also the sense in which we use the term. Such scenarios are increasingly common in the information economy, and it is therefore unsurprising that persuasion has been the subject of a large body of work in recent years, motivated by domains as varied as auctions [11, 25, 24, 9] , advertising [3, 33, 17] , voting [2] , security [45, 42] , multiarmed bandits [37, 38] , medical research [35] , and financial regulation [28, 29] . (For an empirical survey of persuasion, we refer the reader to [21] ). What is surprising, however, is the lack of systematic study of persuasion through a computational lens; this is what we embark on in this paper.
In the large body of literature devoted to persuasion, perhaps no model is more basic and fundamental than the Bayesian Persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow [34] , Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. generalizing an earlier model by Brocas and Carrillo [14] . Here there are two players, who we call the sender and the receiver. The receiver is faced with selecting one of a number of actions, each of which is associated with an a-priori unknown payoff to both players. The state of nature, describing the payoff to the sender and receiver from each action, is drawn from a prior distribution known to both players. However, the sender possesses an informational advantage, namely access to the realized state of nature prior to the receiver choosing his action. In order to persuade the receiver to take a more favorable action for her, the sender can commit to a policy, often known as an information structure or signaling scheme, of releasing information about the realized state of nature to the receiver before the receiver makes his choice. This policy may be simple, say by always announcing the payoffs of the various actions or always saying nothing, or it may be intricate, involving partial information and added noise. Crucially, the receiver is aware of the sender's committed policy, and moreover is rational and Bayesian. We examine the sender's algorithmic problem of implementing the optimal signaling scheme in this paper. A solution to this problem, i.e., a signaling scheme, is an algorithm which takes as input the description of a state of nature and outputs a signal, potentially utilizing some internal randomness.
Two Examples
To illustrate the intricacy of Bayesian Persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow [34] use a simple example in which the sender is a prosecutor, the receiver is a judge, and the state of nature is the guilt or innocence of a defendant. The receiver (judge) has two actions, conviction and acquittal, and wishes to maximize the probability of rendering the correct verdict. On the other hand, the sender (prosecutor) is interested in maximizing the probability of conviction. As they show, it is easy to construct examples in which the optimal signaling scheme for the sender releases noisy partial information regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. For example, if the defendant is guilty with probability 1 3 , the prosecutor's best strategy is to claim "guilt" whenever the defendant is guilty, and also claim "guilt" just under half the time when the defendant is innocent. As a result, the defendant will be convicted whenever the prosecutor claims "guilt" (happening with probability just under 2 3 ), assuming that the judge is fully aware of the prosecutor's signaling scheme. We note that it is not in the prosecutor's interest to always claim "guilt", since a rational judge aware of such a policy would ascribe no meaning to such a signal, and render his verdict based solely on his prior belief -in this case, this would always lead to acquittal.
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A somewhat less artificial example of persuasion is in the context of providing financial advice. Here, the receiver is an investor, actions correspond to stocks, and the sender is a stockbroker or financial adviser with access to stock return projections which are a-priori unknown to the investor. When the adviser's commission or return is not aligned with the investor's returns, this is a nontrivial Bayesian persuasion problem. In fact, interesting examples exist when stock returns are independent from each other, or even i.i.d. Con-sider the following simple example which fits into the i.i.d. model considered in Section 3: there are two stocks, each of which is a-priori equally likely to generate low (L), moderate (M), or high (H) short-term returns to the investor (independently). We refer to L/M/H as the types of a stock, and associate them with short-term returns of 0, 1 + , and 2 respectively. Suppose, also, that stocks of type L or H are associated with poor long-term returns of 0; in the case of H, high short-term returns might be an indication of volatility or overvaluation, and hence poor long-term performance. This leaves stocks of type M as the only solid performers with long-term returns of 1. Now suppose that the investor is myopically interested in maximizing short-term returns, whereas the forward-looking financial adviser is concerned with maximizing long-term returns, perhaps due to reputational considerations. Simple calculation shows that providing full information to the myopic investor results in an expected long-term reward of 1 3 , as does providing no information. An optimal signaling scheme, which guarantees that the investor chooses a stock with type M whenever such a stock exists, is the following: when exactly one of the stocks has type M recommend that stock, and otherwise recommend a stock uniformly at random. A simple calculation using Bayes' rule shows that the investor prefers to follow the recommendations of this partially-informative scheme, and it follows that the expected long-term return is 
Results and Techniques
Motivated by these intricacies, we study the computational complexity of optimal and near-optimal persuasion in the presence of multiple actions. We first observe that a linear program with a variable for each (state-of-nature, action) pair computes a description of the optimal signaling scheme. However, when action payoffs are distributed according to a joint distribution -say exhibiting some degree of independence across different actions -the number of states of nature may be exponential in the number of actions; in such settings, both the number of variables and constraints of this linear program are exponential in the number of actions. It is therefore unsurprising that the computational complexity of persuasion depends on how the prior distribution on states of nature is presented as input. We therefore consider three natural input models in increasing order of generality, and mostly pin down the complexity of optimal and near-optimal persuasion in each. Our first model assumes that action payoffs are drawn i.i.d. from an explicitly described marginal distribution. Our second model considers independent yet non-identical actions, again with explicitly-described marginals. Our third and most general model considers an arbitrary joint distribution of action payoffs presented by a black-box sampling oracle. In proving our results, we draw connections to techniques and concepts developed in the context of Bayesian mechanism design (BMD), exercising and generalizing them along the way as needed to prove our results. We mention some of these connections briefly here, and elaborate on the similarities and differences from the BMD literature in Appendix A.
We start with the i.i.d model, and show two results: a "simple" polynomial-time e−1 e -approximate signaling scheme, and a polynomial-time implementation of the optimal scheme. Both results hinge on a "symmetry characterization" of the optimal scheme in the i.i.d. setting, closely related to the symmetrization result from BMD by [20] but with an important difference which we discuss in Appendix A. Our "simple" scheme decouples the signaling problem for the different actions and signals independently for each. This result implies that signaling in this setting can be "distributed" among multiple non-coordinating persuaders without much loss. Our optimal scheme involves a connection to Border's characterization of the space of feasible reduced-form auctions [13, 12] , as well as its algorithmic properties [15, 1] . This connection involves proving a correspondence between "symmetric" signaling schemes and a subset of "symmetric" single-item auctions; one in which actions in persuasion correspond to bidders in an auction.
Next, we consider Bayesian persuasion with independent non-identical actions. One might expect that the partial correspondence between signaling schemes and single-item auctions in the i.i.d. model generalizes here, in which case Border's theorem -which extends to single-item auctions with independent non-identical bidders -would analogously lead to polynomial time algorithm for persuasion in this setting. However, we surprisingly show that this analogy to singleitem auctions ceases to hold for non-identical actions: we prove that there is no generalized Border's theorem, in the sense of Gopalan et al. [30] , for persuasion with independent actions. Specifically, we show that it is #P-hard to exactly compute the expected sender utility for the optimal scheme, ruling out Border's-theorem-like approaches to this problem unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Our proof starts from the ideas of [30] , but our reduction is much more involved and goes through the membership problem for an implicit polytope which encodes a #P-hard problem -we elaborate on these differences in Appendix A. We note that whereas we do rule out computing an explicit representation of the optimal scheme which permits evaluating optimal sender utility, we do not rule out other approaches which might sample the optimal scheme "on the fly" in the style of Myerson's optimal auction [41] -we leave the intriguing question of whether this is possible as an open problem.
Finally, we consider the black-box model with general distributions, and prove essentially-matching positive and negative results. For our positive result, we exhibit fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) with a bicriteria guarantee. Specifically, our scheme loses an additive in both expected sender utility and incentive-compatibility (as defined in Section 2), and runs in time polynomial in the number of actions and 1 . Our negative results show that this is essentially the best possible for information-theoretic reasons: any polynomial-time scheme in the black box model which comes close to optimality must significantly sacrifice incentive compatibility, and vice versa. We note that our scheme is related to some prior work on BMD with blackbox distributions [16, 44] , but is significantly simpler and more efficient: instead of using the ellipsoid method to optimize over "reduced forms", our scheme simply solves a single linear program on a sample from the prior distribution on states of nature. Such simplicity is possible in our setting due to the different notion of incentive compatibility in persuasion, which reduces to incentive compatibility on the sample using the principle of deferred decisions. We elaborate on this connection in Appendix A.
We remark that our results suggest that the differences between persuasion and auction design serve as a doubleedged sword. This is evidenced by our negative result for independent model and our "simple" positive result for the black-box model.
Additional Discussion of Related Work
To our knowledge, Brocas and Carrillo [14] were the first to explicitly consider persuasion through information control. They consider a sender with the ability to costlessly acquire information regarding the payoffs of the receiver's actions, with the stipulation that acquired information is available to both players. This is technically equivalent to our (and Kamenica and Gentzkow's [34] ) informed sender who commits to a signaling scheme. Brocas and Carrillo restrict attention to a particular setting with two states of nature and three actions, and characterize optimal policies for the sender and their associated payoffs. Kamenica and Gentzkow's [34] Bayesian Persuasion model naturally generalizes [14] to finite (or infinite yet compact) states of nature and action spaces. They establish a number of properties of optimal information structures in this model; most notably, they characterize settings in which signaling strictly benefits the sender in terms of the convexity/concavity of the sender's payoff as a function of the receiver's posterior belief.
Since [14] and [34] , an explosion of interest in persuasion problems followed. The basic Bayesian persuasion model underlies, or is closely related to, recent work in a number of different domains: price discrimination by Bergemann et al. [9] , advertising by Chakraborty and Harbaugh [17] , security games by Xu et al. [45] and Rabinovich et al. [42] , multi-armed bandits by Kremer et al. [37] and Mansour et al. [38] , medical research by Kolotilin [35] , and financial regulation by Gick and Pausch [28] and Goldstein and Leitner [29] . Generalizations and variants of the Bayesian persuasion model have also been considered: Gentzkow and Kamenica [26] consider multiple senders, Alonso and Câmara [2] consider multiple receivers in a voting setting, Gentzkow and Kamenica [27] consider costly information acquisition, Rayo and Segal [43] consider an outside option for the receiver, and Kolotilin et al. [36] considers a receiver with private side information.
Optimal persuasion is a special case of information structure design in games, also known as signaling. The space of information structures, and their induced equilibria, are characterized by Bergemann and Morris [10] . Recent work in the CS community has also examined the design of information structures algorithmically. Work by Emek et al. [24] , Miltersen and Sheffet [40] , Guo and Deligkas [32] , and Dughmi et al. [23] , examine optimal signaling in a variety of auction settings, and presents polynomial-time algorithms and hardness results. Dughmi [22] exhibits hardness results for signaling in two-player zero-sum games, and Cheng et al. [18] present an algorithmic framework and apply it to a number of different signaling problems.
Also related to the Bayesian persuasion model is the extensive literature on cheap talk starting with Crawford and Sobel [19] . Cheap talk can be viewed as the analogue of persuasion when the sender cannot commit to an information revelation policy. Nevertheless, the commitment assumption in persuasion has been justified on the grounds that it arises organically in repeated cheap talk interactions with a long horizon -in particular when the sender must balance his short term payoffs with long-term credibility. We refer the reader to the discussion of this phenomenon in [43] . Also to this point, Kamenica and Gentzkow [34] mention that an earlier model of repeated 2-player games with asymmetric information by Aumann and Maschler [5] is mathematically analogous to Bayesian persuasion.
Various recent models on selling information in [6, 7, 8] are quite similar to Bayesian persuasion, with the main difference being that the sender's utility function is replaced with revenue. Whereas Babaioff et al. [6] consider the algorithmic question of selling information when states of nature are explicitly given as input, the analogous algorithmic questions to ours have not been considered in their model. We speculate that some of our algorithmic techniques might be applicable to models for selling information when the prior distribution on states of nature is represented succinctly.
As discussed previously, our results involve exercising and generalizing ideas from prior work in Bayesian mechanism design. We view drawing these connections as one of the contributions of our paper. In Appendix A, we discuss these connections and differences at length.
PRELIMINARIES
In a persuasion game, there are two players: a sender and a receiver. The receiver is faced with selecting an action from [n] = {1, . . . , n}, with an a-priori-unknown payoff to each of the sender and receiver. We assume payoffs are a function of an unknown state of nature θ, drawn from an abstract set Θ of potential realizations of nature. Specifically, the sender and receiver's payoffs are functions s, r : Θ×[n] → R, respectively. We use r = r(θ) ∈ R n to denote the receiver's payoff vector as a function of the state of nature, where ri(θ) is the receiver's payoff if he takes action i and the state of nature is θ. Similarly s = s(θ) ∈ R n denotes the sender's payoff vector, and si(θ) is the sender's payoff if the receiver takes action i and the state is θ. Without loss of generality, we often conflate the abstract set Θ indexing states of nature with the set of realizable payoff vector pairs (s, r) -i.e., we think of Θ as a subset of R n × R n . We assume that Θ is finite for notational convenience, though this is not needed for our results in Section 5.
In Bayesian persuasion, it is assumed that the state of nature is a-priori unknown to the receiver, and drawn from a common-knowledge prior distribution λ supported on Θ. The sender, on the other hand, has access to the realization of θ, and can commit to a policy of partially revealing information regarding its realization before the receiver selects his action. Specifically, the sender commits to a signaling scheme ϕ, mapping (possibly randomly) states of nature Θ to a family of signals Σ. For θ ∈ Θ, we use ϕ(θ) to denote the (possibly random) signal selected when the state of nature is θ. Moreover, we use ϕ(θ, σ) to denote the probability of selecting the signal σ given a state of nature θ. An algorithm implements a signaling scheme ϕ if it takes as input a state of nature θ, and samples the random variable ϕ(θ).
Given a signaling scheme ϕ with signals Σ, each signal σ ∈ Σ is realized with probability ασ = θ∈Θ λ θ ϕ(θ, σ). Conditioned on the signal σ, the expected payoffs to the receiver of the various actions are summarized by the vector r(σ) = 1 ασ θ∈Θ λ θ ϕ(θ, σ)r(θ). Similarly, the sender's payoff as a function of the receiver's action are summarized by s(σ) = 1 ασ θ∈Θ λ θ ϕ(θ, σ)s(θ). On receiving a signal σ, the receiver performs a Bayesian update and selects an action i * (σ) ∈ argmax i ri(σ) with expected receiver utility maxi ri(σ). This induces utility s i * (σ) (σ) for the sender. In the event of ties when selecting i * (σ), we assume those ties are broken in favor of the sender.
We adopt the perspective of a sender looking to design ϕ to maximize her expected utility σ ασs i * (σ) (σ), in which case we say ϕ is optimal. When ϕ yields expected sender utility within an additive [multiplicative] of the best possible, we say it is -optimal [ -approximate] in the additive [multiplicative] sense. A simple revelation-principle style argument [34] shows that an optimal signaling scheme need not use more than n signals, with one recommending each action. Such a direct scheme ϕ has signals Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn}, and satisfies ri(σi) ≥ rj(σi) for all i, j ∈ [n]. We think of σi as a signal recommending action i, and the requirement ri(σi) ≥ maxj rj(σi) as an incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint on our signaling scheme. We can now write the sender's optimization problem as the following LP with vari-
(1) For our results in Section 5, we relax our incentive constraints by assuming that the receiver follows the recommendation so long as it approximately maximizes his utilityfor a parameter > 0, we relax our requirement to ri(σi) ≥ maxj rj(σi) − , which translates to the relaxed IC con-
. We call such schemes -incentive compatible ( -IC). We judge the suboptimality of an -IC scheme relative to the best (absolutely) IC scheme; i.e., in a bi-criteria sense.
Finally, we note that expected utilities, incentive compatibility, and optimality are properties not only of a signaling scheme ϕ, but also of the distribution λ over its inputs. When λ is not clear from context and ϕ is supported on a superset of λ, we often say that a signaling scheme ϕ is IC [ -IC] for λ, or optimal [ -optimal] for λ. We also use us(ϕ, λ) to denote the expected sender utility
PERSUASION WITH I.I.D. ACTIONS
In this section, we assume the payoffs of different actions are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to an explicitly-described marginal distribution. Specifically, each state of nature θ is a vector in Θ = [m] n for a parameter m, where θi ∈ [m] is the type of action i. Associated with each type j ∈ [m] is a pair (ξj, ρj) ∈ R 2 , where ξj [ρj] is the payoff to the sender [receiver] when the receiver chooses an action with type j. We are given a marginal distribution over types, described by a vector q = (q1, ..., qm) ∈ ∆m. We assume each action's type is drawn independently according to q; specifically, the prior distribution λ on states of nature is given by λ(θ) = i∈[n] q θ i . For convenience, we let ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξm) ∈ R m and ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρm) ∈ R m denote the type-indexed vectors of sender and receiver payoffs, respectively. We assume ξ, ρ, and q -the parameters describing an i.i.d. persuasion instance -are given explicitly.
Note that the number of states of nature is m n , and therefore the natural representation of a signaling scheme has nm n variables. Moreover, the natural linear program for the persuasion problem in Section 2 has an exponential in n number of both variables and constraints. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 2 we seek only to implement an optimal or near-optimal scheme ϕ as an oracle which takes as input θ and samples a signal σ ∼ ϕ(θ). Our algorithms will run in time polynomial in n and m, and will optimize over a space of succinct "reduced forms" for signaling schemes which we term signatures, to be described next.
For a state of nature θ, define the matrix M θ ∈ {0, 1} n×m so that M θ ij = 1 if and only if action i has type j in θ (i.e. θi = j). Given an i.i.d prior λ and a signaling scheme ϕ with signals Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn}, for each i ∈ [n] let αi = θ λ(θ)ϕ(θ, σi) denote the probability of sending σi, and let
jk is the joint probability that action j has type k and the scheme outputs σi. Also note that each row of M σ i sums to αi, and the jth row represents the un-normalized posterior type distribution of action j given signal σi.
R n×m×n the signature of ϕ. The sender's objective and receiver's IC constraints can both be expressed in terms of the signature. In particular, using Mj to denote the jth row of a matrix M , the IC constraints are ρ · M
, and the sender's expected utility assuming the receiver follows the scheme's recommendations is
n×m×n is realizable if there exists a signaling scheme ϕ with M as its signature. Realizable signatures constitutes a polytope P ⊆ R n×m×n , which has an exponential-sized extended formulation as shown below.
Given this characterization, the sender's optimization problem can be written as the following linear program:
Symmetry of the Optimal Scheme
We now show that there always exists a "symmetric" optimal scheme when actions are i.i.d. Given a signature M = (M σ 1 , ..., M σn ), it will sometimes be convenient to think of it as the set of pairs {(
In other words, a symmetric signaling scheme sends each signal with equal probability ||x||1, and induces only two different posterior type distributions for actions:
for the recommended action, and y ||y|| 1 for the others. We call (x, y) realizable if there exists a signaling scheme with (x, y) as its s-signature. The family of realizable s-signatures constitutes a polytope Ps, and has an extended formulation by adding the variables x, y ∈ R m and constraints M σ i i = x and M σ i j = y for all i, j ∈ [n] with i = j to the extended formulation of (asymmetric) realizable signatures defined by Equations in (2).
We make two simple observations regarding realizable ssignatures. First, ||x||1 = ||y||1 = 1 n for each (x, y) ∈ Ps, and this is because both ||x||1 and ||y||1 equal the probability of each of the n signals. Second, since the signature must be consistent with prior marginal distribution q, we have
We show that restricting to symmetric signaling schemes is without loss of generality.
Theorem 3.2. When the action payoffs are i.i.d., there exists an optimal and incentive-compatible signaling scheme which is symmetric. Theorem 3.2 is proved in Appendix B.1. At a high level, we show that optimal signaling schemes are closed with respect to two operations: convex combination and permutation. Specifically, a convex combination of realizable signatures -viewed as vectors in R n×m×n -is realized by the corresponding "random mixture" of signaling schemes, and this operation preserves optimality. The proof of this fact follows easily from the fact that LP (3) has a convex family of optimal solutions. Moreover, given a permutation π ∈ Sn and an optimal signature M = {(M σ i , σi)} i∈[n] realized by signaling scheme ϕ, the "permuted" signature
-where premultiplication of a matrix by π denotes permuting the rows of the matrixis realized by the "permuted" scheme ϕπ(θ) = π(ϕ(π −1 (θ))), which is also optimal. The proof of this fact follows from the "symmetry" of the (i.i.d.) prior distribution about the different actions. Theorem 3.2 is then proved constructively as follows: given a realizable optimal signature M, the "symmetrized" signature M = 1 n! π∈Sn π(M) is realizable, optimal, and symmetric.
Implementing the Optimal Scheme
We now exhibit a polynomial-time algorithm for persuasion in the i.i.d. model. Theorem 3.2 permits re-writing the LP (3) as follows, with variables x, y ∈ R m .
Problem (4) cannot be solved directly, since Ps is defined by an extended formulation with exponentially many variables and constraints, as described in Section 3.1. Nevertheless, we make use of a connection between symmetric signaling schemes and single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders to solve (4) using the Ellipsoid method. Specifically, we show a oneto-one correspondence between symmetric signatures and (a subset of) symmetric reduced forms of single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders, defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 ([13]
). Consider a single-item auction setting with n i.i.d. bidders and m types for each bidder, where each bidder's type is distributed according to q ∈ ∆m. An allocation rule is a randomized function A mapping a type profile θ ∈ [m] n to a winner A(θ) ∈ [n] ∪ { * }, where * denotes not allocating the item. We say the allocation rule has symmetric reduced form τ ∈ [0, 1] m if for each bidder i ∈ [n] and type j ∈ [m], τj is the conditional probability of i receiving the item given she has type j.
When q is clear from context, we say τ is realizable if there exists an allocation rule with τ as its symmetric reduced form. We say an algorithm implements an allocation rule A if it takes as input θ, and samples A(θ).
Theorem 3.4. Consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem with n i.i.d. actions and m types, with parameters q ∈ ∆m, ξ ∈ R m , and ρ ∈ R m given explicitly. An optimal and incentive-compatible signaling scheme can be implemented in poly(m, n) time.
Theorem 3.4 is a consequence of the following set of lemmas.
, and define τ = (
). The pair (x, y) is a realizable s-signature if and only if (a) ||x||1 = 1 n , (b) x + (n − 1)y = q, and (c) τ is a realizable symmetric reduced form of an allocation rule with n i.i.d. bidders, m types, and type distribution q. Moreover, assuming x and y satisfy (a), (b) and (c), and given blackbox access to an allocation rule A with symmetric reduced form τ , a signaling scheme with s-signature (x, y) can be implemented in poly(n, m) time.
Lemma 3.6. An optimal realizable s-signature, as described by LP (4), is computable in poly(n, m) time. m , an allocation rule with reduced form τ can be implemented in poly(n, m) time.
The proofs of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 can be found in Appendix B.2. The proof of Lemma 3.5 builds a correspondence between s-signatures of signaling schemes and certain reduced-form allocation rules. Specifically, actions correspond to bidders, action types correspond to bidder types, and signaling σi corresponds to assigning the item to bidder i. The expression of the reduced form in terms of the s-signature then follows from Bayes' rule. Lemma 3.6 follows from Lemma 3.5, the ellipsoid method, and the fact that symmetric reduced forms admit an efficient separation oracle (see [13, 12, 15, 1] ).
A Simple (1 −
1 e
)-Approximate Scheme
Our next result is a "simple" signaling scheme which obtains a (1 − 1/e) multiplicative approximation when payoffs are nonnegative. This algorithm has the distinctive property that it signals independently for each action, and therefore implies that approximately optimal persuasion can be parallelized among multiple colluding senders, each of whom only has access to the type of one or more of the actions.
Recall from Section 3.1 that an s-signature (x, y) satisfies ||x||1 = ||y||1 = 1 n and x+(n−1)y = q. Our simple scheme, shown in Algorithm 1, works with the following explicit linear programming relaxation of optimization problem (4).
Algorithm 1 has a simple and instructive interpretation. It computes the optimal solution (x * , y * ) to the relaxed problem (5), and uses this solution as a guide for signaling independently for each action. The algorithm selects, independently for each action i, a component signal oi ∈ {HIGH, LOW}. In particular, each oi is chosen so that
, and moreover the events oi = HIGH and oi = LOW induce the posterior beliefs nx * and ny * , respectively, regarding the type of action i.
Algorithm 1 Independent Signaling Scheme
Input: Sender payoff vector ξ, receiver payoff vector ρ, prior distribution q Input: State of nature θ ∈ [m] n Output: An n-dimensional signal σ ∈ {HIGH, LOW} n 1: Compute an optimal solution (x * , y * ) of linear program (5). 2: For each action i independently, set component signal oi to HIGH with probability x * θ i q θ i and to LOW otherwise, where θi is the type of action i in the input state θ. 3: Return σ = (o1, ..
., on).
The signaling scheme implemented by Algorithm 1 approximately matches the optimal value of (5), as shown in Theorem 3.8, assuming the receiver is rational and therefore selects an action with a HIGH component signal if one exists. We note that the scheme of Algorithm 1, while not a direct scheme as described, can easily be converted into one; specifically, by recommending an action whose component signal is HIGH when one exists (breaking ties arbitrarily), and recommending an arbitrary action otherwise. Theorem 3.8 follows from the fact that (x * , y * ) is an optimal solution to LP (5), the fact that the posterior type distribution of an action i is nx * when oi = HIGH and ny * when oi = LOW, and the fact that each component signal is high independently with probability 1 n . We defer the formal proof to Appendix B.3. Remark 3.9. Algorithm 1 signals independently for each action. This conveys an interesting conceptual message. That is, even though the optimal signaling scheme might induce posterior beliefs which correlate different actions, it is nevertheless true that signaling for each action independently yields an approximately optimal signaling scheme. As a consequence, collaborative persuasion by multiple parties (the senders), each of whom observes the payoff of one or more actions, is a task that can be parallelized, requiring no coordination when actions are identical and independent and only an approximate solution is sought. We leave open the question of whether this is possible when action payoffs are independently but not identically distributed.
COMPLEXITY BARRIERS TO PERSUA-SION WITH INDEPENDENT ACTIONS
In this section, we consider optimal persuasion with independent action payoffs as in Section 3, albeit with actionspecific marginal distributions given explicitly. Specifically, for each action i we are given a distribution q i ∈ ∆m i on mi types, and each type j ∈ [mi] of action i is associated with a sender payoff ξ i j ∈ R and a receiver payoff ρ i j ∈ R. The positive results of Section 3 draw a connection between optimal persuasion in the special case of identically distributed actions and Border's characterization of reduced-form singleitem auctions with i.i.d. bidders. One might expect this connection to generalize to the independent non-identical persuasion setting, since Border's theorem extends to singleitem auctions with independent non-identical bidders. Surprisingly, we show that this analogy to Border's characterization fails to generalize. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem with independent actions, with action-specific payoff distributions given explicitly. It is #P -hard to compute the optimal expected sender utility.
Invoking the framework of Gopalan et al. [30] , this rules out a generalized Border's theorem for our setting, in the sense defined by [30] , unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to P N P . We view this result as illustrating some of the important differences between persuasion and mechanism design.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is rather involved. Due to space considerations, we only present a sketch here and refer the reader to the full version for a formal proof. Our proof starts from the ideas of Gopalan et al. [30] , who show the #P-hardness for revenue or welfare maximization in several mechanism design problems. In one case, [30] reduce from the #P -hard problem of computing the Khintchine constant of a vector. Our reduction also starts from this problem, but is much more involved:
2 First, we exhibit a polytope which we term the Khintchine polytope, and show that computing the Khintchine constant reduces to linear optimization over the Khintchine polytope. Second, we present a reduction from the membership problem for the Khintchine polytope to the computation of optimal sender utility in a particularly-crafted instance of persuasion with independent actions. Invoking the polynomial-time equivalence between membership checking and optimization (see, e.g., [31] ), we conclude the #P-hardness of our problem. The main technical challenge we overcome is in the second step of our proof: given a point x which may or may not be in the Khintchine polytope K, we construct a persuasion instance and a threshold T so that points in K encode signaling schemes, and the optimal sender utility is at least T if and only if x ∈ K and the scheme corresponding to x results in sender utility T .
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.1
The Khintchine problem, shown to be #P-hard in [30] , is to compute the Khintchine constant K(a) of a given vector a ∈ R n , defined as K(a) = E θ∼{±1} n [|θ · a|] where θ is drawn uniformly at random from {±1} n . To relate the Khintchine problem to Bayesian persuasion, we begin with a persuasion instance with n i.i.d. actions and two action types, which we refer to as type -1 and type +1. The state of nature is a uniform random draw from the set {±1} n , with the ith entry specifying the type of action i. We call this instance the Khintchine-like persuasion setting. As in Section 3, we still use the signature to capture the payoffrelevant features of a signaling scheme, but we pay special attention to signaling schemes which use only two signals, in which case we represent them using a two-signal signature of the form (M 1 , M 2 ) ∈ R n×2 × R n×2 . The Khintchine polytope K(n) is then defined as the (convex) family of all realizable two-signal signatures for the Khintchine-like persuasion problem with an additional constraint: each signal is sent with probability exactly 1 2 . We first prove that general linear optimization over K(n) is #P-hard by encoding computation of the Khintchine constant as linear optimization over K(n). In this reduction, the optimal solution in K(n) is the signature of the two-signal scheme ϕ(θ) = sign(θ · a), which signals + and − each with probability 1 2 . To reduce the membership problem for the Khintchine polytope to optimal Bayesian persuasion, the main challenges come from our restrictions on K(n), namely to schemes with two signals which are equally probable. Our reduction incorporates three key ideas. The first is to design a persuasion instance in which the optimal signaling scheme uses only two signals. The instance we define will have n + 1 actions. Action 0 is special -it deterministically results in sender utility > 0 (small enough) and receiver utility 0. The other n actions are regular. Action i > 0 independently results in sender utility −ai and receiver utility ai with probability 1 2 (call this type 1i), or sender utility −bi and receiver utility bi with probability 1 2 (call this type 2i), for ai and bi to be set later. Note that the sender and receiver utilities are zero-sum for both types. Since the special action is deterministic and the probability of its (only) type is 1 in any signal, we can interpret any (M 1 , M 2 ) ∈ K(n) as a twosignal signature for our persuasion instance (the row corresponding to the special action 0 is implied). We show that restricting to two-signal schemes is without loss of generality in this persuasion instance. The proof tracks the following intuition: due to the zero-sum nature of regular actions, any additional information regarding regular actions would benefit the receiver and harm the sender. Consequently, sender does not reveal any information which distinguishes between different regular actions. Formally, we prove that there always exists an optimal signaling scheme with only two signals: one signal recommends the special action, and the other recommends some regular action.
We denote the signal that recommends the special action 0 by σ+ (indicating that the sender derives positive utility ), and denote the other signal by σ− (indicating that the sender derives negative utility, as we show). The second key idea concerns choosing appropriate values for {ai}
for a given two-signature (M 1 , M 2 ) to be tested. We choose these values to satisfy the following two properties: (1) For all regular actions, the signaling scheme implementing (M 1 , M 2 ) (if it exists) results in the same sender utility −1 (thus receiver utility 1) conditioned on σ− and the same sender utility 0 conditioned on σ+; (2) the maximum possible expected sender utility from σ−, i.e., the sender utility conditioned on σ− multiplied by the probability of σ−, is − . As a result of Property (1), if (M 1 , M 2 ) ∈ K(n) then the corresponding signaling scheme ϕ is IC and results in expected sender utility T = (since each signal is sent with probability 1 2 ). Property (2) implies that ϕ results in the maximum possible expected sender utility from σ−.
We now run into a challenge: the existence of a signaling scheme with expected sender utility T = does not nec-essarily imply that (M 1 , M 2 ) ∈ K(n) if is large. Our third key idea is to set > 0 "sufficiently small" so that any optimal signaling scheme must result in the maximum possible expected sender utility − 1 2 from signal σ− (see Property (2) above). In other words, we must make so small so that the sender prefers to not sacrifice any of her payoff from σ− in order to gain utility from the special action recommended by σ+. We show that such an exists with polynomially many bits. We prove its existence by arguing that the polytope of incentive-compatible two-signal signatures has polynomial bit complexity, and therefore an > 0 that is smaller than the "bit complexity" of the vertices would suffice.
As a result of this choice of , if the optimal sender utility is precisely T = then we know that signal σ+ must be sent with probability 1 2 since the expected sender utility from signal σ− must be − . We show that this, together with the specifically constructed {ai}
, is sufficient to guarantee that the optimal signaling scheme must implement the given two-signature (M 1 , M 2 ), i.e., (M 1 , M 2 ) ∈ K(n). When the optimal optimal sender utility is strictly greater than
, the optimal signaling scheme does not implement (M 1 , M 2 ), but we show that it can be post-processed into one that does.
THE GENERAL PERSUASION PROBLEM
We now turn our attention to the Bayesian Persuasion problem when the payoffs of different actions are arbitrarily correlated, and the joint distribution λ is presented as a black-box sampling oracle. We assume that payoffs are normalized to lie in the bounded interval, and prove essentially matching positive and negative results. Our positive result is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for optimal persuasion with a bi-criteria guarantee; specifically, we achieve approximate optimality and approximate incentive compatibility in the additive sense described in Section 2. Our negative results show that such a bi-criteria loss is inevitable in the black box model for information-theoretic reasons.
A Bicriteria FPTAS
Theorem 5.1. Consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem in the black-box oracle model with n actions and payoffs in [−1, 1], and let > 0 be a parameter. An -optimal and -incentive compatible signaling scheme can be implemented in poly(n, 1 ) time.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we show that a simple MonteCarlo algorithm implements an approximately optimal and approximately incentive compatible scheme ϕ. Notably, our algorithm does not compute a representation of the entire signaling scheme ϕ as in Section 3, but rather merely samples its output ϕ(θ) on a given input θ. At a high level, when given as input a state of nature θ, our algorithm first takes K = poly(n, 1 ) samples from the prior distribution λ which, intuitively, serve to place the true state of nature θ in context. Then the algorithm uses a linear program to compute the optimal -incentive compatible scheme ϕ for the empirical distribution of samples augmented with the input θ. Finally, the algorithm signals as suggested by ϕ for θ. Details are in Algorithm 2, which we instantiate with > 0 and K = log( 4n ) .
We note that relaxing incentive compatibility is necessary for convergence to the optimal sender utility -we prove this formally in Section 5.2. This is why LP (6) features relaxed incentive compatibility constraints. Instantiating Algorithm 2 with = 0 results in an exactly incentive compatible scheme which could be far from the optimal sender utility for any finite number of samples K, as reflected in Lemma 5.4. Output: Signal σ ∈ Σ, where Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn}.
1: Draw integer uniformly at random from {1, . . . , K}, and denote θ = θ. 2: Sample θ1, . . . , θ −1 , θ +1 . . . , θK independently from λ, and let the multiset λ = {θ1, . . . , θK } denote the empirical distribution augmented with the input state θ = θ . 3: Solve linear program (6) to obtain the signaling scheme ϕ : λ → ∆(Σ). 4: Output a sample from ϕ(θ) = ϕ(θ ).
Theorem 5.1 follows from three lemmas pertaining to the scheme ϕ implemented by Algorithm 2. Approximate incentive compatibility for λ (Lemma 5.2) follows from the principle of deferred decisions, linearity of expectations, and the fact that ϕ is approximately incentive compatible for the augmented empirical distribution λ. A similar argument, also based on the principal of deferred decisions and linearity of expectations, shows that the expected sender utility from our scheme when θ ∼ λ equals the expected optimal value of linear program (6), as stated in Lemma 5.3. Finally, we show in Lemma 5.4 that the optimal value of LP (6) is close to the optimal sender utility for λ with high probability, and hence also in expectation, when K = poly(n, 1 ) is chosen appropriately; the proof of this fact invokes standard tail bounds as well as structural properties of linear program (6) , and exploits the fact that LP (6) relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. We prove all three lemmas in Appendix C.1. Even though our proof of Lemma 5.4 is self-contained, we note that it can be shown to follow from [44, Theorem 6] with some additional work.
Lemma 5.2. Algorithm 2 implements an -incentive compatible signaling scheme for prior distribution λ. log( 4n ) and its input θ is drawn from λ, the expected optimal value of the linear program (6) solved in
Step 3 is at least OP T − . Expectation is over the random input θ as well as the Monte-Carlo sampling performed by the algorithm.
Information-Theoretic Barriers
We now show that our bi-criteria FPTAS is close to the best we can hope for: there is no bounded-sample signaling scheme in the black box model which guarantees incentive compatibility and c-optimality for any constant c < 1, nor is there such an algorithm which guarantees optimality and c-incentive compatibility for any c < . Formally, we consider algorithms which implement direct signaling schemes. Such an algorithm takes as input a black-box distribution λ supported on [−1, 1] 2n and a state of nature θ ∈ [−1, 1] 2n , where n is the number of actions, and outputs a signal σ ∈ {σ1, . . . , σn} recommending an action. We say such an algorithm is -incentive compatible [ -optimal] if for every distribution λ the signaling scheme A(λ) is -incentive compatible [ -optimal] for λ. We define the sample complexity SCA(λ, θ) as the expected number of queries made by A to the blackbox given inputs λ and θ, where expectation is taken the randomness inherent in the Monte-Carlo sampling from λ as well as any other internal coins of A. We show that the worst-case sample complexity is not bounded by any function of n and the approximation parameters unless we allow bi-criteria loss in both optimality and incentive compatibility. More so, we show a stronger negative result for exactly incentive compatible algorithms: the average sample complexity over θ ∼ λ is also not bounded by a function of n and the suboptimality parameter. Whereas our results imply that we should give up on exact incentive compatibility, we leave open the question of whether an optimal and -incentive compatible algorithm exists with poly(n, 1 ) average case (but unbounded worst-case) sample complexity. , then for every integer K there is a distribution λ = λ(K) on 3 actions and 3 states of nature, and θ in the support of λ, such that SCA(λ, θ) > K.
Our proof of each part of this theorem involves constructing a pair of distributions λ and λ which are arbitrarily close in statistical distance, but with the property that any algorithm with the postulated guarantees must distinguish between λ and λ . We defer the proof to Appendix C.2.
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We thank David Kempe for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback and suggestions. connection hinges crucially on the symmetries of the optimal scheme, and fails to generalize to the case of persuasion with independent non-identical actions (analogous to independent non-identical bidders) as we show in Section 4. We view this as evidence that persuasion and auction designwhile bearing similarities and technical connections -are importantly different.
Section 4 shows that our Border's theorem-based approach in Section 3 can not be extended to independent non-identical actions. Our starting point are the results of Gopalan et al. [30] , who rule out Border's-theorem like characterizations for a number of mechanism design settings by showing the #P-hardness of computing the maximum expected revenue or welfare. Our results similarly show that it is #P hard to compute the maximum expected sender utility, but our reduction is much more involved. Specifically, whereas we also reduce from the #P-hard problem of computing the Khintchine constant of a vector, unlike in [30] our reduction must go through the membership problem of a polytope which we use to encode the Khintchine constant computation. This detour seems unavoidable due to the different nature of the incentive-compatibility constraints placed on a signaling scheme.
3 Specifically, we present an intricate reduction from membership testing in this "Khintchine polytope" to an optimal persuasion problem with independent actions.
Our algorithmic result for the black box model in Section 5 draws inspiration from, and is technically related to, the work in [15, 1, 16, 44] on algorithmically efficient mechanisms for multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, an alternative algorithm for our problem can be derived using the framework of reduced forms and virtual welfare of Cai et al. [16] with significant additional work. 4 For this, a different reduced form is needed which allows for an unbounded "type space", and maintains the correlation information across actions necessary for evaluating the persuasion notion of incentive compatibility, which is importantly different from incentive compatibility in mechanism design. Such a reduced form exists, and the resulting algorithm is complex and invokes the ellipsoid algorithm as a subroutine. The algorithm we present here is much simpler and more efficient both in terms of runtime and samples from the distribution λ over states of nature, with the main computational step being a single explicit linear program which solves for the optimal signaling scheme on a sample λ from λ. The analysis of our algorithm is also more straightforward. This is possible in our setting due to our different notion of incentive compatibility, which permits reducing incentive compatibility on λ to incentive compatibility on the sample λ using the principle of deferred decisions.
B. OMISSIONS FROM SECTION 3
B.1 Symmetry of the Optimal Scheme (Theorem 3.2)
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need two closure properties of 3 In [30], Myerson's characterization is used to show that optimal mechanism design in a public project setting directly encodes computation of the Khintchine constant. No analogous direct connection seems to hold here. 4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this connection.
optimal signaling schemes -with respect to permutations and convex combinations. We use π to denote a permutation of [n], and let Sn denote the set of all such permutations. We define the permutation π(θ) of a state of nature θ ∈ [m] n so that (π(θ))j = θ π(j) , and similarly the permutation of a signal σi so that π(σi) = σ π(i) . Given a signature
, we define the permuted signature
, where πM denotes applying permutation π to the rows of a matrix M .
Lemma B.1. Assume the action payoffs are i.i.d., and let π ∈ Sn be an arbitrary permutation. If M is the signature of a signaling scheme ϕ, then π(M) is the signature of the scheme ϕπ defined by ϕπ(θ) = π(ϕ(π −1 (θ))). Moreover, if ϕ is incentive compatible and optimal, then so is ϕπ.
Proof. Let M = {(M σ , σ)} σ∈Σ be the signature of ϕ, as given in the statement of the lemma. We first show that π(M) = {(πM σ , π(σ))} σ∈Σ is realizable as the signature of the scheme ϕπ. By definition, it suffices to show that
Now, assuming ϕ is incentive compatible, we check that ϕπ is incentive compatible by verifying the relevant inequality for its signature.
j ≥ 0 Moreover, we show that the sender's utility is the same for ϕ and ϕπ, completing the proof.
is the signature of scheme ϕA, and B = (B σ 1 , . . . , B σn ) is the signature of a scheme ϕB, then their convex combination
is the signature of the scheme ϕC which, on input θ, outputs ϕA(θ) with probability t and ϕB(θ) with probability 1−t. Moreover, if ϕA and ϕB are both optimal and incentive compatible, then so is ϕC .
Proof. This follows almost immediately from the fact that the optimization problem 3 is a linear program, with a convex feasible set and a convex family of optimal solutions. We omit the straightforward details.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Given an optimal and incentive compatible signaling scheme ϕ with signature {(M σ i , σi)} i∈[n] , we show the existence of a symmetric optimal and incentive-compatible scheme of the form in Definition 3.1. According to Lemma B.1, for π ∈ Sn the signature {(πM σ i , π(σi))} i∈[n] -equivalently written as {(πM σ π −1 (i) , σi} i∈[n] -corresponds to the optimal incentive compatible scheme ϕπ. Invoking Lemma B.2, the signature
also corresponds to an optimal and incentive compatible scheme, namely the scheme which draws a permutation π uniformly at random, then signals according to ϕπ.
Observe that the ith row of the matrix πM σ π −1 (i) is the π −1 (i)th row of the matrix M σ π −1 (i) . Expressing A σ i i as a sum over permutations π ∈ Sn, and grouping the sum by k = π −1 (i), we can write
which does not depend on i. Similarly, the jth row of the matrix πM σ π −1 (i) is the π −1 (j)th row of the matrix
j as a sum over permutations π ∈ Sn, and grouping the sum by k = π −1 (i) and l = π −1 (j), we can write
which does not depend on i or j. Let
The signature {(A σ i , σi)} i∈[n] therefore describes an optimal, incentive compatible, and symmetric scheme with ssignature (x, y).
B.2 The Optimal Scheme
Proof of Lemma 3.5 For the "only if" direction, ||x||1 = 1 n and x + (n − 1)y = q were established in Section 3.1. To show that τ is a realizable symmetric reduced form for an allocation rule, let ϕ be a signaling scheme with s-signature (x, y). Recall from the definition of an s-signature that, for each i ∈ [n], signal σi has probability 1/n, and nx is the posterior distribution of action i's type conditioned on signal σi. Now consider the following allocation rule: Given a type profile θ ∈ [m] n of the n bidders, allocate the item to bidder i with probability ϕ(θ, σi) for any i ∈ [n]. By Bayes rule,
Therefore τ is indeed the reduced form of the described allocation rule.
For the "if" direction, let τ , x, and y be as in the statement of the lemma, and consider an allocation rule A with symmetric reduced form τ . Observe that for each player i ∈ ij is the probability that ϕA(θ) = σi and θi = j; by definition, this equals the probability that A allocates the item to player i and her type is j, which is τjqj = xj. As a result, the signature M of ϕA satisfies M σ i i = x for every action i. If ϕA were symmetric, we would conclude that its s-signature is (x, y) since every s-signature (x, y ) must satisfy x+(n−1)y = q (see Section 3.1). However, this is not guaranteed when the allocation rule A exhibits some asymmetry. Nevertheless, ϕA can be "symmetrized" into a signaling scheme ϕ A which first draws a random permutation π ∈ Sn, and signals π(ϕA(π −1 (θ))). That ϕ A has s-signature (x, y) follows a similar argument to that used in the proof of Theorem 3.2, and we therefore omit the details here.
Finally, observe that the description of ϕ A above is constructive assuming black-box access to A, with runtime overhead that is polynomial in n and m.
Proof of Lemma 3.6
By Lemma 3.5, we can re-write LP (4) as follows:
) is a realizable SRF,
where "SRF" stands for symmetric reduced form. From [13, 12, 15, 1] , we know that the family of all the realizable symmetric reduced forms constitutes a polytope, and moreover that this polytope admits an efficient separation oracle. The runtime of this oracle is polynomial in m and n, and as a result the above linear program can be solved in poly(n, m) time using the Ellipsoid method.
B.3 A Simple (1 − 1/e)-Approximate Scheme Proof of Theorem 3.8
Given a binary signal σ = (o1, . . . , on) ∈ {HIGH, LOW} n , the posterior type distribution for an action equals nx * if the corresponding component signal is HIGH, and equals ny * if the component signal is LOW. This is simply a consequence of the independence of the action types, the fact that the different component signals are chosen independently, and Bayes' rule. The constraint ρ · x * ≥ ρ · y * implies that the receiver prefers actions i for which oi = HIGH, any one of which induces an expected utility of nρ · x * for the receiver and nξ · x * for the sender. The latter quantity matches the optimal value of LP (5). The constraint ||x||1 = 1 n implies that each component signal is HIGH with probability 1 n , independently. Therefore, the probability that at least one component signal is HIGH equals 1
Since payoffs are nonnegative, and since a rational receiver selects a HIGH action when one is available, the sender's overall expected utility is at least a 1 − Fix , K, and λ, and let ϕ denote the resulting signaling scheme implemented by Algorithm 2. Let θ ∼ λ denote the input to ϕ, and σ ∼ ϕ(θ) denote its output. First, we condition on the empirical sample λ = {θ1, . . . , θK } without conditioning on the index of the input state of nature θ, and show that -incentive compatibility holds subject to this conditioning. The principle of deferred decisions implies that, subject to this conditioning, θ is uniformly distributed in λ. By definition of linear program (6), the signaling scheme ϕ computed in Step 3 is -incentive compatible scheme for the empirical distribution λ. Since σ ∼ ϕ(θ) and θ is conditionally distributed according to λ, this implies that all -incentive compatibility constraints conditionally hold; formally, the following holds for each pair of actions i and j:
Removing the conditioning on λ and invoking linearity of expectations shows that ϕ is -incentive compatible for λ, completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.3 As in the proof of Lemma 5.2, we condition on the empirical sample λ = {θ1, . . . , θK } and observe that θ is uniformly distributed in λ after this conditioning. The conditional expectation of sender utility equals
where ϕ is the signaling scheme computed in Step 3 based on λ. Since this is precisely the optimal value of the LP (6) solved in Step 3, removing the conditioning and invoking linearity of expectations completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.4
Recall that linear program (1) solves for the optimal incentive compatible scheme for λ. It is easy to see that the linear program (6) solved in step 3 is simply the instantiation of LP (1) for the empirical distribution λ consisting of K samples from λ. To prove the lemma, it would suffice to show that the optimal incentive-compatible scheme ϕ * corresponding to LP (1) remains -incentive compatible and -optimal for the distribution λ, with high probability. Unfortunately, this approach fails because polynomially-many samples from λ are not sufficient to approximately preserve the incentive compatibility constraints corresponding to lowprobability signals (i.e., signals which are output with probability smaller than inverse polynomial in n). Nevertheless, we show in Claim C.1 that there exists an approximately optimal solution ϕ to LP (1) with the property that every signal σi is either large, which we define as being output by ϕ with probability at least 4n assuming θ ∼ λ, or honest in that only states of nature θ with i ∈ argmax j rj(θ) are mapped to it. It is easy to see that sampling preserves incentive-compatibility exactly for honest signals. As for large signals, we employ tail bounds and the union bound to show that polynomially many samples suffice to approximately preserve incentive compatibility (Claim C.2).
Claim C.1. There is a signaling scheme ϕ which is incentive compatible for λ, induces sender utility us( ϕ, λ) ≥ OP T − 2 on λ, and such that every signal of ϕ is either large or honest.
Proof. Let ϕ * be the optimal incentive-compatible scheme for λ -i.e. the optimal solution to LP (1). We call a signal σ small if it is output by ϕ * with probability less than 4n , i.e. if θ∈Θ λ θ ϕ * (θ, σ) < 4n , and otherwise we call it large. Let ϕ be the scheme which is defined as follows: on input θ, it first samples σ ∼ ϕ * (θ); if σ is large then ϕ simply outputs σ, and otherwise it recommends an action maximizing receiver utility in state of nature θ --i.e., outputs σ i for i ∈ argmax i ri(θ). It is easy to see that every signal of ϕ is either large or honest. Moreover, since ϕ * is incentive compatible and ϕ only replaces recommendations of ϕ * with "honest" recommendations, it is easy to check that ϕ is incentive compatible for λ. Finally, since the total probability of small signals in ϕ * is at most 4 , and utilities are in [−1, 1], the sender's expected utility from ϕ is no worse than 2 smaller than her expected utility from ϕ * .
Claim C.2. Let ϕ be the signaling scheme from Claim C.1. With probability at least 1 − 8 over the sample λ, ϕ is -incentive compatible for λ, and moreover us( ϕ, λ) ≥ us( ϕ, λ) − 4 .
Proof. Recall that ϕ is incentive compatible for λ, and every signal is either large or honest. Since λ is a set of samples from λ, it is easy to see that incentive compatibility constraints pertaining to the honest signals continue to hold over λ. It remains to show that incentive compatibility constraints for large signals, as well as expected sender utility, are approximately preserved when replacing λ with λ.
Recall that the incentive-compatibility constraints require E θ [ ϕ(θ, σi)(ri(θ) − rj(θ))] ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ [n]. Moreover, the sender's expected utility is E θ [ with probability at least 1 − 8 . This bound on the additive loss translates to -incentive compatibility for the large signals, and is less than the permitted decrease of 4 for expected sender utility.
The above claims, coupled with the fact that sender payoffs are bounded in [−1, 1], imply that the expected optimal value of linear program (6) is at least OP T − , as needed.
C.2 Information-Theoretic Barriers
Impossibility of Incentive Compatibility (Proof of Theorem 5.5 (a))
Consider a setting with two states of nature, which we will conveniently refer to as rainy and sunny. The receiver, who we may think of as a daily commuter, has two actions: walk and drive. The receiver slightly prefers driving on a rainy day, and strongly prefers walking on a sunny day. We summarize the receiver's payoff function, parametrized by δ > 0, in Table 1 . The sender, who we will think of as a municipality with black-box sample access to weather reports drawn from the same distribution as the state of nature, strongly prefers that the receiver chooses walking regardless of whether it is sunny or rainy: we let s walk = 1 and s drive = 0 in both states of nature. . It is easy to see that the unique direct incentive-compatible scheme for λr always recommends driving, and hence results in expected sender utility of 0. In contrast, a simple calculation shows that always recommending walking is incentive compatible for λs, and results in expected sender utility 1. If algorithm A is incentive compatible and c-optimal for a constant c < 1, then A(λr) must never recommend walking whereas A(λs) must recommend walking with constant probability at least (1 − c) overall (in expectation over the input state of nature θ ∼ λs as well as all other internal randomness). Consequently, given a black box distribution D ∈ {λr, λs}, evaluating A(D, θ) on a random draw θ ∼ D yields a tester which distinguishes between λr and λs with constant probability 1 − c.
Since the total variation distance between λr and λs is O(δ), it is well known (and easy to check) that any black-box algorithm which distinguishes between the two distributions with Ω(1) success probability must take Ω( 1 δ ) samples in expectation when presented with one of these distributions. As a consequence, the average-case sample complexity of A on either of λr and λs is Ω( 1 δ ). Since δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small, this completes the proof.
Impossibility of Optimality (Proof of Theorem 5.5 (b))
Consider a setting with three actions {1, 2, 3} and three corresponding states of nature θ1, θ2, θ3. In each state θi, the receiver derives utility 1 from action i and utility 0 from the other actions. The sender, on the other hand, derives utility 1 from action 3 and utility 0 from actions 1 and 2. For an arbitrary parameter δ > 0, we define two distributions λ and λ over states of nature with total variation distance δ, illustrated in Table 2 . Assume algorithm A is optimal and c-incentive compatible for a constant c < . The optimal incentive-compatible scheme for λ results in expected sender utility 3δ by recommending action 3 whenever the state of nature is θ2 or θ3, and with probability
when the state of nature is θ1. Some calculation reveals that in order to match this expected sender utility subject to c-incentive compatibility, signaling scheme ϕ = A(λ ) must satisfy ϕ (θ2, σ3) ≥ µ for µ = 1 − 4c > 0. In other words, ϕ must recommend action 3 a constant fraction of the time when given state θ2 as input. In contrast, since c < 1 2 it is easy to see that ϕ = A(λ) can never recommend action 3: for any signal, the posterior expected receiver reward for action 3 is 0, whereas one of the other two actions must have posterior expected receiver reward at least 1 2 . It follows that given D ∈ {λ, λ }, a call to A(D, θ2) yields a tester which distinguishes between λ and λ with constant probability µ. Since λ and λ have statistical distance δ, we conclude that the worst case sample complexity of A on either of λ or λ is Ω( 1 δ ). Since δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small, this completes the proof.
